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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA

______________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE: THE STATUS OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, IN CAMBODIA AND UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN 1975

SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING WHETHER OR NOT GENOCIDE WAS A CRIME IN CAMBODIA IN 1975 AND
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS A CRIME UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW . ALSO, WHETHER THE
LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARTICLE 4 OF THE ECCC STATUTE AND THE CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE COULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES ON
PROSECUTIONS BEFORE THE ECCC.
______________________________________________________________________________
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) has resolved to

prosecute members of the Khmer Rouge for the crime of genocide committed between 1975 and
1979.1* In order to enable this prosecution, Cambodia enacted Article 4 of the ECCC statute in
2004, which closely mirrors the language for Articles II and III of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“the Convention”). Because Cambodia
enacted Article 4 of the ECCC almost thirty years after the start of the alleged crimes, there is a
question as to whether genocide was indeed a crime in Cambodia at the time the acts of the
Khmer Rouge took place. Further, while the language of the ECCC statute is very close to that of
the Convention, it is unclear whether the slight difference can have any consequences when the
ECCC tries to prosecute Khmer Rouge members. This memorandum will address the status of
the law against genocide under, customary international law (“CIL”) and in Cambodia, in 1975.
Further, it will discuss the language differences between the ECCC statute and the Convention,
and how those differences may affect the prosecution of the Khmer Rouge.

1

* “1. Were the offences described in Article 4 of the ECCC Statute part of customary international law in 1975? 2.
Alternatively, were they applicable in Cambodia in 1975? 3. Will the differences of language, between this article
and the crimes described in the Genocide Convention, have any consequences on their prosecution before the
ECCC? 4. If the answer to question no. 3 is in the affirmative, then what remedial measures should the prosecution
take to address these likely consequences?”
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B. Summary of conclusions
i. Were the offences described in Article 4 of the ECCC Statute part
of CIL in 1975? Were they applicable in Cambodia in 1975?

a. The offences described in Article 4 of the ECCC Statute were part
of CIL in 1975.
Article 4 of the ECCC Statute describes the crime of genocide. State practice and opinio
juris are both components in deciding what constituted CIL. These components can be shown
through the dealings of international organizations and resolutions passed by the United Nations.
The United Nations passed Resolution 96(I) in 1946, followed by the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Both of these documents, passed
almost thirty years prior to the events in Cambodia, support the assertion that genocide was a
part of CIL in 1975.
b. The wording of the Convention shows that the United Nations
intended for genocide to be a crime under international law.

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly
states that in 1948 the United Nations considered genocide to be a crime under international law.
References to the wording of the Convention and an advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice confirming that genocide is a crime under CIL have been used by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. These
two tribunals, established in the 1990’s, refer to language confirming the criminality of genocide
as a part of international law dating back to 1951.
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c. Cambodia acceded to the Convention in 1950 and never revoked its
signature; therefore, Cambodia is subject to the principles as
set forth in the Convention.

Cambodia, though not a member of the United Nations, acceded to the Convention in
1950. The Convention has a provision for the procedure for withdrawal if a State no longer
wishes to be a party to the Convention; however, Cambodia has never exercised this option.
Thus, in 1975, Cambodia was still party to the Convention and therefore bound by its principles.
d. Under erga omnes principle, genocide is a crime under
international law.
Cambodia, along with every other State, has an obligation to uphold basic human
freedoms. The International Court of Justice recognizes the principles of the Convention as
principles that are binding upon all States. Thus, even if Cambodia did not have an obligation
under the Convention, it is still obliged to uphold the principles set forth by the Convention due
to the principles of obligations erga omnes.
e. Numerous trials and laws prior to 1975 have found that the
prohibition of genocide is a part of CIL.
Starting with the Nuremberg trials and continuing through 1975, various courts around
the world have upheld the principles of the Convention. Often, this occurred regardless of
whether or not a statute prohibiting genocide was in force at the time the acts occurred. The
courts often found genocide to be a part of CIL. This is evidence that the prohibition of genocide
was part of CIL in 1975.
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f. That Cambodia did not codify genocide as a crime under its
domestic laws does not prevent the crimes enumerated in the
Convention and Article 4 of the ECCC Statute from being
applicable in Cambodia in 1975.

Cambodia shows no evidence of having codified genocide as a crime in its domestic laws
prior to 1975. However, this is not evidence that genocide is not a crime under CIL. Furthermore,
the ECCC statute is an ex post facto law which covers the period of 1975-1979. While there is
some opposition internationally to ex post facto laws in general, there are also cases in which
States have applied statutes for genocide ex post facto. Even if a State has no domestic law
against genocide, this would not prevent genocide from being against the law in that State under
CIL.
ii. Will the differences of language between Article 4 of the ECCC statute
and the crimes described in the Convention have any consequences on
their prosecution before the ECCC? If the answer to this question is in the
affirmative, then what remedial measures should the prosecution take to
address these likely consequences?

a. Any differences of language between the Convention and
Article 4 of the ECCC statute should be controlled by the
Convention in accord with the language of the first sentence of
Article 4 of the ECCC.

When interpreting a statute, it is important to look at the intent of the drafters of the
statute. The drafters of Article 4 of the ECCC statute clearly stated that the Convention describes
the crime of genocide. Further, this statement comes at the beginning of Article 4 and the
wording of the sentence says that the ECCC has the power to prosecute genocide ‘as defined’ in
the Convention. Thus, this sentence shows that the ECCC drafters intended for the Convention to
control the definition of the crime of genocide. The remaining section of Article 4 is simply an
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attempt to restate the Convention. Thus, when there is a difference between the language of
Article 4 of the ECCC statute and the Convention, the language of the Convention is controlling.
b. Though the language of the ECCC and the Convention are limiting
in different ways, in order to avoid acquittal due to the differences
in language, the prosecution should charge the defendants under
both the ECCC statute and the Convention.
There is a language difference between Article 4 of the ECCC and the Convention. The
ECCC statute is more limiting in some respects while the Convention is more limiting in other
respects. To avoid any problems that might arise, the tribunal should charge defendants under
both the ECCC statute and the Convention. This way, if there is ambiguity between which statute
is controlling, or if a charge falls under one document but not the other, there will be no problem
of the charge being incomplete.
II.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Scope of international law
CIL applies to all States in a disagreement, even if they are not party to the treaties in

which the rules in question are stated.2 Thus, the passage of a resolution or treaty may still bind
States not party to the resolution or treaty, or States that object to the passage of the resolution or
treaty. Further, a State may disagree that a principle is actually part of CIL; however, if the
majority of the States exhibit a pattern “of generally shared legal expectation and conforming
behavior,” the principle still binds the disagreeing State.3 Therefore, even without evidence of a

2

Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87(857) INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175, 177
(Mar. 2005). (Emphasis in original) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
3

Jordan Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 59, 64 (1990). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60].
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principle’s being part of CIL through action by the United Nations or another international
organization, a court may still find a principle to be part of CIL. Furthermore, CIL can still bind
a State, which is not part of the United Nations, to the principles set forth by the United Nations.
i. What constitutes CIL?
CIL can make certain acts illegal, even if they are not part of a State’s criminal code
because CIL “is of a universally obligatory nature.”4 “A norm of CIL is proved by demonstrating
the existence of two elements, state practice and opinio juris.”5 These two elements must
demonstrate that the issue is “settled practice” and is “obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.”6 For genocide to be a crime under CIL, it must also meet these factors. Thus, there
must be evidence of State practice and opinio juris to in order to say that genocide was a part of
CIL in 1975.
However, other norms of CIL include erga omnes and jus cogens.7 Obligations erga
omnes is an obligation a State owes to all other States.8 Jus cogens is a “peremptory norm” that

4

JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SHARON A. WILLIAMS, MICHAEL SCHARF, JIMMY GURULÉ & BRUCE
ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (Carolina Academic Press 1996). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
5

Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence, 11(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 82, 117
(Feb. 1989). (explaining how a principle becomes part of customary international law) (Emphasis in original)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
6

Id. at 117.
7

PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 5. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
8

Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign
Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 191, 225 (1983).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 61].
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trumps any conflicting law.9 Since jus cogens is considered an already established norm, it is
beyond the scope of this memorandum.

9

PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 5. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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a. State practice is an element of CIL.
International law under State practice arises out of a “usage or a continuous repetition of
the same kind of acts.”10 Thus, if many States condemn and refrain from a certain action, that
action can become a crime under CIL. However, the conduct of States is not the only evidence of
CIL. Further evidence of State practice can be “the actions of international organizations” such
as the United Nations.11 Therefore, when delegates from a State take a position on an issue
during meetings or conferences of international organizations, this is expressing State practice.12
Thus, “the decisions of such organizations…can afford abundant and easily accessible evidence
of the growth of international custom.”13 Therefore, the votes of the delegates of States and the
decisions of organizations such as the United Nations can carry great weight in deciding what
constitutes State practice and its effect on CIL.
b. Opinio juris is an element of CIL.
Opinio juris is evidence that the custom in question is already in existence.14 Under
opinio juris, a “simple usage can be transformed into a custom with [the] binding power.”15
Evidence of opinio juris can be a General Assembly resolution and “the existence of such a
resolution declaring, or purporting to declare, the law will require only comparatively slight

10

Hannum, supra note 4, at 117. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
11

Id. at 118.
12

Id. at 118.
13

Id. at 118.
14

Id. at 119.
15

Id. at 117-118.
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evidence of actual practice to support the conclusion that the rule in question has passed into
general customary [international] law.”16 Therefore, a resolution passed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations would carry great weight in determining what principles are part
of CIL. Once the General Assembly passes a resolution, little more evidence is required for the
international community to recognize a custom as part of CIL.
c. Erga omnes is another form of international law.
Erga omnes is the idea that States have an obligation “towards the international
community as a whole.”17 In 1970, in the judgment in Barcelona Traction, the International
Court of Justice stated that “such obligations derive…in contemporary international law, from
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person.”18 Thus, even if a State is not a party to a treaty
or has no domestic laws in regards to a particular issue, a State may have an obligation to
recognize certain acts as crimes under CIL.
ii. Genocide in international law
a. The history of genocide
What is currently termed genocide has been committed throughout history all over the
world.19 Cases of what may be termed genocide today date back to the “eighth and seventh

16

Id. at 118-119.
17

Payam Akhavan, Recent Development: Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, ¶ 5 (1995). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
18

Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
19

LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (Yale University Press 1982) (1981).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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centuries B.C.”20 The most commonly cited cases are those of the killing of Armenians by the
Turkish government in 1915 and the atrocities before and during World War II.21 However, it
has taken the world centuries to give this practice a name. In 1944, Raphael Lemkin first used
the word genocide “in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.”22 In the aftermath of World War
II and in conjunction with the efforts of Raphael Lemkin, the General Assembly of the United
Nations passed Resolution 96(I) in 1946.23 Shortly thereafter, in 1948, the General Assembly
passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.24 Today,
international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are prosecuting instances of genocide.25
b. General Assembly Resolution 96(I) as evidence of opinio juris
Following the Nuremberg trials, the United Nations set out to define genocide by passing
Resolution 96(I) on December 11, 1946.26 In Resolution 96(I), the General Assembly “affirm[ed]
that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns.”27 Further,
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under the Resolution, there is no need for a connection between genocide and an “armed
conflict.” 28 The Resolution also proposed elements for “the definition of genocide.”29 However,
in 1946, “international criminal law was still underdeveloped” and the General Assembly
realized that it would take more to have genocide recognized as a crime under international
law.30 The General Assembly is not a “world legislature” and passing a resolution is not the same
as a national government enacting laws.31 Nevertheless, under the idea of opinio juris, the
passage of Resolution 96(I) is evidence that the prohibition against genocide is part of CIL.
While even the General Assembly realized that the Resolution alone would not make genocide a
part of CIL, that realization does not prevent the existence of Resolution 96(I) from carrying
substantial weight in the determination.
However, to say that Resolution 96(I) is binding upon all States upon its passage might
be premature. While the Resolution is evidence of CIL, Cambodia did not become a member of
the United Nations until 1955, nine years after the passage of Resolution 96(I).32 Though the
United Nations and the actions of its members carry a lot of weight in declaring CIL, it is
important to remember that Cambodia had no part in the passage of Resolution 96(I) and was not
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then a part of the United Nations. Therefore, Cambodia may not have considered itself bound by
a United Nations resolution.
c. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide as
evidence of State practice
Following Resolution 96(I), the United Nations approved the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide in December of 1948, in which the “contracting parties
confirm that genocide . . . is a crime under international law.”33
For the Convention to bind a State, signature must be perfected by filing an
instrument of ratification…Customary law, as codified in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, requires that between the time of signature and ratification
a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty.34
Thus, even a signature to the Convention would bind a State to abide by the principles of
the Convention until ratification or withdrawal of the signature. Cambodia was not a member of
the United Nations at the time of the Convention’s approval; however, it was one of the twenty,
non-member States, which the United Nations invited to sign the Convention.35 Cambodia
acceded to the Convention, without reservation, on October 14, 1950.36 The Convention “entered
into force” on January 12, 1951.37 Cambodia went beyond just signing the Convention by
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acceding to it, becoming a full-fledged party. As party to the Convention, Cambodia was bound
by the Convention when it came into force in 1951, over twenty years prior to 1975.
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However, the Convention alone does not make law. One commentator, F. Blaine Sloan
noted in 1948 that:
While it must be conceded that the General Assembly cannot enact new law, it has
already adopted resolutions declaring what it finds to be an existing rule of
international law. Perhaps the most important of such resolutions have been the
affirmation of the Nuremberg principles and the declaration that genocide is an
international crime…If fifty-eight nations unanimously agree on a statement of
existing law it would seem that such a declaration would be all but conclusive
evidence of such a rule, and agreement by a large majority would have great value
in determining what is existing law.38
Twenty-five States were party to the Convention when it came into force in 1951.39 By
1971, sixty-one States had either ratified or acceded to the Convention.40 The sheer number of
States that were party to the Convention in 1971 is even more weight that the Convention and its
principles had become established CIL. Thus, the agreement of fifty-eight States for the United
Nations to pass Resolution 96(I), followed by the passing of the Convention, is evidence
suggesting that genocide is part of existing CIL. That numerous United Nations member States
and non-member States continued to become party to the Convention after it came into force
further suggests that genocide, if not a part of CIL in 1951, was a part of CIL by 1971. If the
combination of Resolution 96(I) and the Convention meet the requirements of State practice and
opinio juris, as has been previously suggested, then genocide is a crime under CIL. All States are
subject to CIL. Thus, genocide was a crime in Cambodia upon the passage of the Convention, or
at least by 1971.
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i) Withdrawal from the Convention
A party to the Convention may withdraw by submitting a written notification.41 As of
2000, no State has withdrawn from the Convention.42 Cambodia’s accession occurred in 1951,
and there is no evidence that it ever submitted a written notification to the United Nations that it
intended to withdrawal from the Convention. Thus, Cambodia was still a party to the Convention
in 1975. Therefore, Cambodia remained bound by the Convention and its principles in 1975 and
is still bound today.
ii) Opposition to the Convention
a) State sovereignty
There are various protests against the Convention. First, some think that genocide is a
domestic issue, not an international affair.43 In further support of this argument, the American
Bar Association opposed the Convention, considering it a “clear invasion of states’ rights” and
suggested that international law was too underdeveloped.44 The American Bar Association was
concerned with the sovereignty of the United States.
One aspect of the opposition to the Convention on the grounds of State sovereignty is an
argument against Article VII of the draft convention.45 Article VII of the draft convention, which
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became Article VI of the Convention, gives an international tribunal jurisdiction to prosecute
offenders.46 The Soviet Union argued that the courts of a State should handle the punishment of
genocide because international jurisdiction would be “a violation of the sovereign right of
[S]tates.”47
While this is an argument against the Convention, it is purely a jurisdictional issue and
has nothing to do with whether or not genocide is a crime. Further, one widely held view in
international law is “that law derives its binding force from the consent of sovereign states.”48 On
this view, when a group of sovereign States became party to the Convention, they bound
themselves to follow the principles it set forth. Thus, when Cambodia became party to the
Convention, Cambodia bound itself to follow the principles of the Convention. Additional,
because Cambodia acceded to the Convention without reservation, there is nothing to suggest
Cambodia objected to the Convention on State sovereignty grounds. Therefore, objections to the
Convention based on State sovereignty are irrelevant because Cambodia consented to the binding
force of the Convention.
b) Victor’s justice
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Anonymous, supra note 44, at 479. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].; G.A. Res. 260 (III), supra
note 23, Art. VI. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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Another opposition to the Convention is the argument that genocide is a crime that occurs
during war, “in occupied territory” or within “a state’s own territory.” 49 As a result, the usual
perpetrators are members of the government or people somehow associated with the government,
not private individuals.50 In these scenarios, the leaders of a State are unlikely to follow the
principles of the Convention since it would be the responsibility of the government, which has
committed the crime, to bring the perpetrators of genocide to justice.51 In order to bring those
responsible for genocide to justice, there would need to be “a totally victorious revolution,
overthrowing the government guilty of those crimes, or the total victor in an international war,”
which could give rise to “victor’s justice” objections.52 Further, “there is always the fear that a
victorious nation or group of nations will join together to define as criminal conduct such
activities as they consider contrary to their own interests.”53 Thus, the winning group of nations
after a war could outlaw and prosecute acts it considers wrong.
In the case of Cambodia, Vietnam invaded, toppling the Khmer Rouge regime.54 Thus,
the defendants could raise a victor’s justice argument, claiming that the post-Khmer Rouge
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government is a victor enacting laws to punish acts that were not criminal when committed.
However, this argument would only stand if genocide was not a crime in Cambodia, or a crime
under CIL, in 1975.
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c) Is the Convention self-executing?
Another objection to the Convention, at least in the United States, dealt with whether or
not the Convention is a self-executing treaty. People based this argument on the fear that
ratification of a self-executing treaty is very close to amending the U.S. Constitution based on
“Article VI (2) of the Constitution.”55 One commentator, Carl B. Rix, said that “it seems to be
plain that the essential portions of the Genocide Treaty…are self-executing.”56 Thus, if the treaty
is self-executing, ratification is like implementing law in a State. This raised a fear that, by
ratification, the Convention would become part of the law of the United States, even without
enactment of national legislation. But not every State follows the same self-executing treaty
rationale. Ratified treaties in some other countries still require an “express act of the national
legislature.”57 Just because the United States has a self-executing provision in its constitution
does not mean that Cambodia had such a provision.
In contract, many other commentators have viewed Article V of the Convention as
requiring national legislatures to enact domestic laws.58 One U.S. Senate Committee found that
“[Article V] makes clear that the [C]onvention is construed not [to] be self-executing and that
implementing legislation is required to give effect to its provisions.”59 If the Convention does
55

Carl B. Rix, Human Rights and International Law, 43 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (1949). (Rix was a president of
the American Bar Association and Chairman of the Special Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations).
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require enactment of domestic legislation, then the Convention did not automatically bind
Cambodia to its principle because of Cambodia’s accession.
However, whether or not the Convention is self-executing may be irrelevant. “[T]he
rapporteur of the UN study of the [C]onvention….pointed out that under Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, no party to the [Co]nvention could invoke a provision of its
constitution or laws as a reason for not living up to its international obligations.”60 On this view,
once a State is party to a treaty, under the Vienna Convention, the treaty is binding upon that
State, regardless of its own constitution or laws. Thus, by signing the Convention, whether it
requires later domestic legislation or not, the Convention bound Cambodia to adhere to its
principles. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, though drafted in 1969, did
not come into effect until 198061 and hence was not in force prior to 1975. Therefore, the
Convention may not automatically bind Cambodia to its principles simply because Cambodia
was party to it.
iii) Democratic Kampuchea’s protest to Vietnam’s signing of
the Convention
On November 9, 1981, Democratic Kampuchea protested Vietnam’s signing of the
Convention.62 Within the protest, Kampuchea stated that the Vietnamese had committed

CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1100 (Carolina Academic Press 1996). [reproduced in accompanying
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genocide within Kampuchea and that Kampuchea had “denounced and condemned them” since
December of 1978.63 While the official protest of Cambodia came after the end of the Pol Pot
regime in 1979, the condemnation of Vietnam’s actions and the statement that Vietnam
committed genocide preceded the end of Pol Pot’s rule. This is recognition that the Convention
was in force in Cambodia in 1978, during the Pol Pot regime, and that the regime recognized
genocide as a crime. This does not establish that Cambodia recognized the Convention in 1975.
However, since Cambodia did sign the Convention, there is nothing to suggest it had refrained
from recognition of the Convention until 1978.
d. Erga omnes
As previously stated,64 the International Court of Justice, in the main opinion in
Barcelona Traction, acknowledged that the outlawing of genocide falls under obligations erga
omnes.65 Thus, under erga omnes principles, the international community outlaws genocide
because of an obligation each State owes to all other States. Therefore, genocide would
constitute a crime under CIL simply due to obligation, regardless of the existence of the
Convention. Further, Judge Riphagen, in a dissenting opinion in Barcelona Traction, stated that
“customary international law recognizes—in particular since the Second World War—respect for
fundamental human freedoms as an interest of the international community.”66 While obligations
erga omnes has likely been a concept of international law for a long time, Judge Riphagen’s
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statement shows that the obligation of one State to other States with regards to “fundamental
human freedoms” predates 1975 and thus Cambodia would have an obligation to outlaw
genocide. Further, statements by the International Court of Justice “noted as early as 1951 that
the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations
as binding, even without any conventional obligation.”67 This recognition by the International
Court of Justice in 1951 further suggests that genocide is a crime under CIL, with or without the
existence of the Convention. Whether a State is party to the Convention is irrelevant because CIL
binds all States to uphold the Convention’s principles as an erga omnes norm.
B. Trials
i. Nuremberg trials
Subsequent to World War II, the Allied powers created the Nuremberg Tribunal to
prosecute “the major war criminals.”68 “Although the final judgment in the Trial of the Major
War Criminals, issued 30 September-1 October 1946, never used the term, it described at great
length what was in fact the crime of genocide.”69 While the Tribunal judgment refrained from the
use of the term genocide, a prosecutor from France used the term at the close of the trials in
August of 1946, stating that “this is a crime so monstrous, so undreamt of in history…that the
term “genocide” had to be coined to define it.”70 Further, a prosecutor from Britain used the
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word genocide during a summation, saying that its application went beyond that of the
“extermination of the Jewish people or of the gypsies.”71 Resolution 96(I) and the Convention
did not yet exist, yet those associated with the Nuremberg trials recognized genocide and the
French prosecutor’s statement claimed genocide as a crime. The Nuremberg trials are seen as the
“first formal, legal recognition” of the term ‘genocide.’”72 The term ‘genocide’ being recognized
by the British and French prosecutors is a sign of the recognition of genocide on the international
level.
Further, there are numerous similarities between Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter,
and the Convention. Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter forbids:
Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds of
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.73
While this is not identical to the Convention, there are similarities. Article II of the Convention
mentions “racial or religious groups” and forbids “killing” and “causing serious bodily or mental
harm” to these groups.74 ‘Killing’ under the Convention would be the same as ‘murder’ and
‘extermination’ under the Charter. Further, while the Charter forbids actions based on ‘racial or
religious grounds,’ the Convention forbids it in respect to ‘racial or religious groups.’ (Emphasis
added.) If someone is being killed on ‘racial or religious grounds’ it is because they are part of
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that ‘racial or religious group.’ Thus, in this respect, the Charter and the Convention are
forbidding the same thing. Also, the Convention forbids ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’
to the enumerated groups. The Charter considers it a crime to commit ‘inhumane acts against any
civilian population.’ In this respect, the Charter is broader than the Convention because it does
not specify the forbidden result of the ‘inhumane acts.’ However, the Charter clearly does not
apply to non-civilian populations. Arguably, ‘inhumane acts’ could result in the ‘serious bodily
or mental harm’ as specified in the Convention, making the Charter and the Convention similar.
Further, the groups enumerated in the Convention, specifically the ‘racial or religious groups,’
are unlikely to be non-civilian. The similarities between Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter
and the Convention are clear. The trials at Nuremberg are evidence that at least some principles
that were set out in the Convention were considered part of CIL during the initial Nuremberg
Trials.
In a trial subsequent to the Trail of the Major War Criminals, the Tribunal charged
members of the Einsatzgruppen under Control Council Law No. 10.75 The language of Article
II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10 is almost identical to the language of Article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter,76 and is therefore also similar to the Convention. Further, the
Einsatzgruppen indictment, dated July of 1947, charged that “the acts, conduct, plans, and
enterprises charged…were carried out as part of a systematic program of genocide.”77 Also,
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during opening statements in September of 1947, the Prosecutor stated that “genocide, the
extermination of whole categories of human beings, was a foremost instrument of the Nazi
doctrine.”78 While the original Nuremberg trials support the view that genocide as a term was
recognized, the fact that the Tribunal charged members of the Einsatzgruppen using the term
‘genocide,’ and the subsequent use of the term by the Prosecutor, is evidence that the prohibition
of genocide was a part of CIL.
ii. The Israeli Court recognized genocide as a part of CIL.
The Nuremberg Tribunal was not the only court to recognize genocide as a crime. Adolf
Eichmann was “the Head of the Central Office for Jewish Affairs” during the Nazi reign in
Europe.79 “Survivors of concentration camps” found Eichmann in Argentina after a fifteen-year
search and delivered him to the Israeli Government.80 The Israeli Government accused Eichmann
“of being instrumental…in the extermination of millions of Jews, in creating murderous
conditions for millions and in devising measures to sterilize Jews” and “similar crimes” against
other groups.81 Part of Eichmann’s indictment fell under “the Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Law, enacted by the Israeli Parliament in 1950.”82
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The Eichmann case is significant because, while the Israeli Court did not specifically
charge Eichmann with genocide, it stated that the “the crime against Jewish people was patterned
along the crime of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention.”83 In 1951, Israel ratified
the Convention.84 The above statement by the Court shows that it recognized the Convention and
was trying to uphold its principles. Also, the Eichmann Court gave its opinion that “the crimes
dealt with in Eichmann’s case were not crimes under Israeli law only; they were, in essence,
offences against the law of nations.”85 Further, the Court found that “the authority and
jurisdiction to try crimes under international law are universal.”86 These statements further
suggest that the Court recognized the existence of genocide as a crime under CIL. Additionally,
the Israeli Supreme Court found that “the principles of the 1948 United Nations Genocide
Convention…were already part of customary international law when the dreadful crimes [of the
Holocaust] were perpetrated.”87 In 1961, the Court found Eichmann guilty of “crimes against the
Jewish people, and against humanity, for committing war crimes, and for being a member of
criminal organization as defined by Article 10 of the Nuremberg Charter.”88 The Israeli Court’s

83

Covey Oliver, Judicial Decisions: Jurisdiction of Israel to try Eichmann—international law in relationship to the
Israeli Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 812 (1962) (giving an overview of the
Eichmann trial). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
84

Lasok, supra note 78, at 357. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
85

LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, THE RECORDS: THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN FOR HIS CRIMES AGAINST THE
JEWISH PEOPLE AND AGAINST HUMANITY 304 (Alfred A. Knoff, Inc. 1963) (1962). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 40].
86

Oliver, supra note 82, at 808. (emphasis in original). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
87

Ralph Ruebner, Essay: The Evolving Nature of the Crime of Genocide, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1227, 1228
(Sum. 2005). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
88

LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, supra note 84, at 301. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

35

Lynn Greening
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2008
actions are significant because they show recognition of the crime of genocide under CIL a
decade prior to 1975.
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iii. People’s Revolutionary Tribunal in Phnom Penh
a. Decree Law No. 1 and the trials
The Israeli Court was not the only tribunal to recognize genocide as a crime. The
government of Cambodia “passed Decree Law No. 1 establishing the People’s Revolutionary
Tribunal (PRT) ‘to try the Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique for the Crime of Genocide’” on July 15,
1979.89 The establishment of the PRT and Decree Law No. 1 shows that the government of
Cambodia recognized the crime of genocide. Decree Law No. 1 states that, “in accordance with
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” the “decree applies
to the criminal acts…committed prior to its signing.”90 Further, “the judgment made explicit
reference to ‘international law punishing the crime of genocide, in particular the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948.’”91 The decree
and judgment also clearly shows that Cambodia recognized that the principles of the Convention
were part of CIL during the period of 1975 to 1979. The PRT convicted the Pol Pot – Ieng Sary
clique for genocide under Decree Law No. 192 stating the “the accused Pol Pot…and Ieng Sary
are guilty of genocide.”93 This conviction is more evidence that Cambodia considered genocide a
crime.
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However, the wording of Decree Law No. 1 is not identical to that of the Convention. 94
Arguably, the ECCC can see this as a sign that Cambodia was not truly accepting the Convention
as binding. Yet the crimes described in Decree Law No. 1, such as “planned massacres of groups
of innocent people,” are essentially the same as those described in the Convention.95 As a result,
the ECCC can see the similarities between the offenses described in the Convention and those
described under Decree Law No. 1 as supporting the proposition that the Cambodian government
recognized the Convention in 1975.
b. People’s Revolutionary Tribunal in Phnom Penh as nothing but a
show trial
One of the arguments against giving weight to the initial PRT trial in 1975, and the
conviction of the Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique, is that the trial was simply a show trial.96 The
argument is that the trial was not legitimate and was “designed to serve political, not legal
ends.”97 If the ECCC views the 1975 trial by the PRT as illegitimate, then the fact that the PRT
charged the Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique with genocide carries little weight in determining
whether genocide was a crime under CIL or in Cambodia in 1975. In addition, in 1996, the King
of Cambodia pardoned Ieng Sary from “the sentence of death and the confiscation of all his
property” which the PRT ordered after his conviction.98 The decree lists no specific reason for
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the pardon. This can be taken as a further sign that the PRT trial simply was a show trial with
very little, if no, legal bearing.
In contrast, however, some commentators still view the PRT trial in Cambodia as
significant because “it was the first trial of a government leader, or anyone else, under the
Genocide Convention.”99 Further, some commentators believe that the PRT trial paved the way
for later proceedings under the Convention such as Bosnia’s charge of genocide against
Yugoslavia in 1993.100 These views suggest that the PRT trial gave legitimacy, in Cambodia and
elsewhere in the world, to the crime of genocide in CIL and to the Convention.
iv. Trial of Macias in Equatorial Guinea
Actions of other States, such as Equatorial Guinea, also have bearing on whether or not
genocide was a crime under CIL. Francisco Macias Nguema (“Macias”) became President of
Equatorial Guinea in 1968, instituting a “vast campaign of torture and murder.”101 The
International Commission of Jurists, “an organization of human rights lawyers” founded in
1952,102 reported on the situation in Equatorial Guinea in its journal in 1978.103 An army coup

Royal Decree Pardoning Ieng Sary , NS/RKT/0996/72 (Sept. 14, 1996), available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/legislation/2/pardon_for_ieng_sary.pdf. (last visited on Apr. 18, 2008).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70].
99

DE NIKE ET AL.,
100

supra note 89, at 17. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

Id. at 17.
101

LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 133 (Yale University Press 1985). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 33].
102

HOWARD B. TOLLEY, JR. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS: GLOBAL ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
xii (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
103

Niall MacDermot ed., Human Rights in the World: Equatorial Guinea, 21 THE REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 1 (Dec. 1978). (detailing the conditions and human rights violations in Equatorial Guinea).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58].

39

Lynn Greening
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2008
overthrew Macias in 1979.104 Equatorial Guinea put him on trial and he was “found guilty of
numerous crimes, including genocide.”105 “However, the legal officer of the International
Commission of Jurists” decided that Macias’s conviction for genocide was wrong because
Equatorial Guinea did not codify genocide in its domestic laws nor had it “signed or ratified” the
Convention.106
One interpretation of the conclusion by the legal officer of the International Commission
of Jurists is that it is an opinion, of a member of a group of international human rights lawyers,
that genocide was not part of CIL during the Macias’ regime. However, as a non-governmental
organization, the opinion of the International Commission of Jurists does not carry the same
weight as government-backed organizations such as the United Nations.
The situation is different in Cambodia because Cambodia did accede to the Convention.
Further, Macias’s conviction for genocide is relevant as evidence of the Convention’s acceptance
as part of CIL. The fact that the new government of Equatorial Guinea charged Macias with
genocide, without domestic codification, suggests that Equatorial Guinea did recognize genocide
as a crime under CIL. Of course, a person can also argue that the recognition of genocide in
Equatorial Guinea was a case of victor’s justice.
v. The Russell Tribunal
Bertrand Russell, a Nobel laureate, started the Russell Tribunal in May of 1967 to inquire
into the actions “of the United States in Vietnam.”107 The Russell Tribunals are considered to be
104
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105
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“show trials,” creating “no law” and the “verdicts have no legal effect”108 because the Tribunal
“lacked [S]tate power.”109 During the second session, one of the Tribunal’s tasks was to
determine whether the United States had committed genocide.110 The Tribunal voted
unanimously that the Government of the United States was “guilty of genocide against the
people of Vietnam.”111 Further, the Second Russell Tribunal convicted Brazil of genocide in
1975.112 Even though the Russell Tribunals carry no legal effect, the Tribunal attracted the mass
media and the media coverage “undermined the moral legitimacy of the United States” and their
actions in Vietnam.113 The mere media coverage of the original Russell Tribunal expressed a
message that genocide is unacceptable, even if the Tribunal had no real legal standing. Further,
the Russell Tribunal’s existence, and subsequent gatherings, made a statement that the
participants condemned genocide as a crime in 1967 and 1975.
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vi. Recognition of Genocide as a crime under CIL by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
The Court in the Akayesu case, heard by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
in 1998, confirmed that genocide is part of CIL.114 In doing so, they referenced the “United
Nations' Secretary-General in his Report on the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.”115 The Report for the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia states that:
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law for which individuals shall be tried and punished. The
Convention is today considered part of international customary law as evidenced
by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951.116
Thus, two international tribunals have recognized that genocide is a crime under CIL. While the
establishment of the Yugoslavia tribunal in 1993117 and the Rwanda tribunal in 1994118 were
subsequent to 1975, their references to the establishment of genocide under CIL date back to
1951. This is further evidence that genocide was a crime under CIL as of 1951, and therefore
was a crime under CIL in 1975.
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vii. Bangladesh
Similar to the tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Bangladesh also recognized genocide
as a crime. Bangladesh enacted the Bangladesh International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of July 19,
1973 with the intention to hold trials for a group of Pakistani nationals “for serious crimes, which
include genocide.”119 The Act provided for the punishment of persons, regardless of their
nationality, who committed genocide in Bangladesh territory prior to and subsequent to the
establishment of the Act.120 Interestingly, when Bangladesh passed the Act, it had not become
party to the Convention, which it did not accede until October 5, 1998.121 Just as Equatorial
Guinea prosecuted Macias without being a member of the Convention, Bangladesh attempted to
do the same thing. However, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India reached an agreement which
returned the suspected Pakistani nationals to Pakistan, the Pakistani Government apologized, and
neither Bangladesh nor Pakistan held a trial.122 Even though no country ever held a trial in
regards to the suspected acts of genocide in Bangladesh, the passage of the Bangladesh
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act is another example of the recognition of genocide as an
international crime. Unlike Cambodia, Bangladesh had not acceded to the Convention, yet
Bangladesh recognized genocide as a crime.
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III.

CODIFICATION OF GENOCIDE IN DOMESTIC LAWS AND EX POST FACTO
LAWS
A. Codification in domestic laws
i. Cambodia did not codify the Convention in its domestic laws.
Article V of the Convention says that parties to the Convention are to enact domestic

laws “to give effect to the provisions of the” Convention.123 Section G of the Penal Code of
Cambodia from 1956, in French, does not list genocide.124 The lack of a listing for genocide
suggests that Cambodia did not enact domestic law for the crime of genocide at the time Pol Pot
came to power in 1975. Further, the three pages of the Penal Code of Cambodia, which are
available to this writer in English translation, do not contain any language suggesting that
Cambodia had codified genocide as a crime in 1956.125 Thus, this writer cannot confirm whether
Cambodia complied with Article V of the Convention. Further, Article 4 of the ECCC enacts the
provisions of the Convention, strongly suggesting that Cambodia did not previously codify
genocide in its domestic laws. While some may argue this suggests that Cambodia did not
choose to view the Convention as part of its laws, the lack of codification of genocide in
domestic laws is not a revocation of compliance with the Convention.
Of course, not all countries consider themselves bound by international conventions. For
example, in Finland, the ratification of a treaty or convention “does not require the Finnish courts
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domestically to follow” the norm set out in the convention or treaty.126 On this view, that fact
that Cambodia is party to the Convention does not necessarily mean that the domestic courts
must reinforce it. However, the ECCC is not a purely domestic court, as evidenced by the
involvement and cooperation of the United Nations.127 The international involvement in the
ECCC may require the ECCC to uphold the norms of conventions and treaties to which
Cambodia is party.
ii. Codification of genocide in the domestic laws of other States
The timing of domestic legislation with regards to the crime of genocide varies greatly
from State to State, with some States enacting national legislation immediately upon becoming a
party to the Convention and others waiting years to do so. Burkina Faso acceded to the
Convention in 1965, yet it did not add a genocide provision to its penal code until 1996.128
Ethiopia, one of the first to sign the Convention in 1948 and ratify the Convention in 1949, made
genocide part of its penal code in 1957.129 Further, Brazil, which ratified the Convention in 1952,
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enacted domestic legislation in 1956.130 Thus, Cambodia is not the only State that did not enact
domestic genocide legislation immediately upon becoming party to the Convention.
In some cases, States who are not party to the Convention have enacted legislation for the
crime of genocide. Yugoslavia’s genocide code came into effect in 1977 while it did not accede
to the Convention until 2001.131 Even Indonesia, which is not party to the Convention, has
enacted domestic legislation in regards to the crime of genocide.132 This is evidence that these
States considered genocide a crime under CIL. Today, at least eighty States have enacted some
form of domestic legislation in regards to the crime of genocide, including Cambodia.133
While not all States that are party to the Convention have enacted domestic laws in
regards to genocide, many have done so. However, even if a State is party to the Convention and
has not enacted domestic legislation, this does not necessarily mean that genocide is not a part of
the State’s domestic laws. Even if a State has not enacted domestic legislation in regard to
genocide, CIL still binds the State. Therefore, if genocide is a crime under CIL, then the
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principles of CIL binds a State, whether or not it is party to the Convention, and whether or not it
has enacted domestic legislation.
B. Ex Post Facto Laws
i. Ex Post Facto nature of Article 4 of the ECCC statute
Article 4 of the ECCC statute states that it is prosecuting persons for crimes committed
from 1975-1979.134 Yet, the Cambodian government did not enact the ECCC statute until
2004.135 This could create a question of whether or not laws such as the ECCC statute, enacted
ex post facto, are legal. One author noted that laws applied retroactively are “prohibited by the
[Universal] Declaration of Human Rights.”136 The author also stated that under this principle
“the Nuremberg trial would have been annulled.”137 Therefore, under this view, the Declaration
of Human Rights would also prohibit Article 4 of the ECCC. However, some courts and the
United Nations express other views of ex post facto laws.
Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “no
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was
committed.”138 (Emphasis added). Thus, if the offense would constitute an offense under CIL,
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the fact that it was not an offense codified under national law does not prevent prosecution.
Further, Nicholas N. Kittrie noted in a paper published in 1964 that:
The Nuremberg court and, subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly in
its affirmation of the charter and judgment of the tribunal gave broad international
recognition to the legality of such ex post facto legislation. A substantial school of
legal scholars subscribes to the view that a penal statute need not be condemned
merely because of its retroactive effect, as long as the crime penalized was
obviously and undeniably prohibited under the laws of most civilized nations.139
Thus, international law has no ban against “retroactive criminal statutes in domestic law.”140
Under this argument, Article 4 of the ECCC is valid law, regardless of its ex post facto nature.
Therefore, even though Cambodia did not codify genocide in its domestic laws as set out in the
Convention prior to 1975, Article 4 is an effective domestic codification of the Convention.
Under this theory, Cambodia can successfully apply Article 4 retroactively to cover the period
from1975-1979.
ii. Ex Post Facto Law issues in regard to the Eichmann case
In the Eichmann case discussed above,141 there was an argument that the Nazi
Collaborators (Punishment) Act of 1950 was “invalid for the punishment of acts which were
carried out before the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948.”142 Further, the Israeli Court
referenced Justice Blackstone when he suggested that it would be unjust for a party to suffer

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), Art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200B (Dec.
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consequences when his actions were not criminal when committed.143 The same argument
against ex post facto laws in the Eichmann case can arise in Cambodia. While, unlike Israel,
Cambodia was a State in 1975, the analysis in regards to the crime of genocide would be the
same.
Like many other States, Israel enacted ex post facto laws “to punish Nazi crimes.”144
These crimes “were recognized as crimes by the laws of all civilized nations…before and after
the Nazi regime.”145 Israel was entitled to enact these laws because of the “universal character of
the crimes” and because those who committed the crimes knew their actions were criminal.146
The Eichmann case gives further validity to ex post facto laws for crimes, such as genocide,
which the civilized world condemns.
iii. Ex post facto law issues in regard to Bangladesh
Similar to the Eichmann case in Israel, and as discussed previously in this paper,147
Bangladesh enacted the Bangladesh International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of July 19, 1973.148
The Act provided for the punishment of persons who committed genocide in Bangladesh
territory prior to and subsequent to the establishment of the Act.149 Thus, Bangladesh also
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enacted a domestic law that applied ex post facto. This is just another example of a State
applying the codification of genocide in domestic laws, ex post facto. Since Bangladesh did not
hold the proposed trials under the Act, the question of the legality of ex post facto laws in this
instance did not occur. However, this does not negate that Bangladesh did pass an ex post facto
criminal law in regard to genocide.
iv. The Convention applies, regardless of the legality of Article 4 of
the ECCC
Whether or not genocide was a crime under domestic Cambodian law in 1975 is
irrelevant in regard to whether or not genocide was a crime in Cambodia in 1975. Even if Article
4 of the ECCC is a prohibited ex post facto law under international law, Cambodia is still party
to the Convention. One commentator has noted that the important element of the Convention was
to declare the “rule of law in international relations,” so those accused of genocide are unable to
cite “lack of law” as a way to evade punishment.150 Thus, the lack of codification of genocide in
Cambodian law in 1975 would not enable those accused of the crime in Cambodia to use lack of
codification as a defense. Further, as Schabas stated, “designation of genocide as a crime under
international law means that perpetrators are subject to prosecution, even when there has been no
breach of the domestic law in force at the time of the crime.”151 Thus, even if Cambodia were not
party to the Convention and had no domestic legislation prohibiting genocide, those accused of
genocide could still be prosecuted under CIL.
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IV.

DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 4 OF THE ECCC STATUTE
A. Statutory Interpretation
i. Intent
When interpreting a statute, the intent of the legislature is very important. In relying on

legislative intent, the “common purposes or common motivations” of the legislative body are
considered.152 Thus, when interpreting Article 4 of the ECCC statute, it is important to consider
the intent of the ECCC.
ii. The use of the term “as defined”
Article 4 of the ECCC statute states that the ECCC has the power to prosecute those who
commit “the crimes of genocide as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.”153 (Emphasis added). This statement shows that it was the
intent of the drafters of the ECCC to have Article 4 simply restate the Convention. The term ‘as
defined’ points to the Convention for the definition of genocide. Further, this statement precedes
the enumeration of acts of genocide in Article 4, thus making the language of the Convention
controlling. Additionally, “the meaning of the written general rule of law under consideration
must be consistent not only with the historical process of the institution…but also with the entire
system of existing legal institutions.”154 Since Article 4 used the term ‘as defined’ in reference to
the Convention, it suggests that Article 4 must be consistent with the Convention because the
Convention is part of the historical process. Further, the United Nations, which is responsible for
152
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the Convention, supports the ECCC. Since Cambodia is party to the Convention, the Convention
is part of the existing legal system. Thus, the ECCC should construe any discrepancies between
Article 4 and the Convention in light of the Convention.
Further, it is the intent of the group enacting the law that is important, not the intent of the
judges.155 Therefore, the judges are required to look at the intent of those passing Article 4 of the
ECCC statute. The wording of Article 4 suggests the intent to defer to the Convention, and thus
should consider the intent of those enacting the Convention. It is clear from the Convention and
the preceding Resolution 96(I) that the United Nations intended to make genocide a crime under
international law.
iii. Use of the term “such as” and “as such”
It is important in the interpretation of statutes that “fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand.”156 The ECCC statute uses “such as”
immediately followed by a list of acts.157 Using the term ‘such as’ prior to a list suggests that the
list of acts are just examples and are illustrative, not exhaustive.158 Further, in McBoyle v. United
States, the statute stated “the term ‘motor vehicle’ shall include an automobile, automobile truck,
automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on
rails.”159 The Court considered the meaning of motor vehicle and did not limit it to those
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enumerated in the statute; however, the Court did say that the vehicle would be limited to ones
that run on land.160 While the term ‘motor vehicles’ in McBoyle was not limited to the specific
examples in the statute, the examples gave rise to an explanation of the type or motor vehicle that
is covered under the statute. Similarly, by using ‘such as’ in Article 4 of the ECCC statute, the
prohibited acts are not limited to those enumerated immediately after the ‘such as’ term, but may
be limited to acts similar to those enumerated. Thus, Article 4 of the ECCC is broad in this
respect.
In contract, the Convention, in Article II, states that “genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such” followed by a list of acts.161 (Emphasis added.) ‘As such’ means “with respect to
its inherent nature.”162 This ‘as such’ language in the Convention reflects on the nature of the
listed acts. While the use of ‘as such’ is not itself limiting, the language ‘genocide means any of
the following acts’ is limiting the acts that are considered genocide to those that are enumerated
after ‘as such.’. Thus, under the Convention, only those acts enumerated are a violation of the
Convention. This would result in Article 4 of the ECCC having a broader application in the sense
that non-listed acts can still fall under its prohibition, whereas the Convention is limited to only
those acts listed.

160

McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26-27.
161

G.A. Res. 260 (III), supra note 23, Art. II. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
162

Definition of ‘as such,’ available at http://www.wordwebonline.com/en/ASSUCH. (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 68].

53

Lynn Greening
International War Crimes Research Lab
Spring 2008
iv. Use of “acts of genocide” in the ECCC vs. “genocide” in the
Convention
Article 4 of the ECCC uses the term “acts of genocide” instead of “genocide,” as used in
Article III of the Convention.163 While this causes the two documents to look different, in reality
there is no difference between the terms ‘acts of genocide’ and ‘genocide.’164 Thus, ‘genocide’ is
an ‘act of genocide’ and vice versa. Therefore, this difference in language does not cause a
different interpretation between the two documents.
v. Differences between Article 4 of the ECCC and Article III of the
Convention
Article 4 of the ECCC lists only three specific acts as compared to the five acts listed in
Article III of the Convention.165 At first glance, this would make the ECCC statute more limiting
than the Convention. However, ‘genocide,’ which is listed in the Convention and not the ECCC,
would fall under the ECCC’s ‘participation in acts of genocide.’166 Committing ‘genocide’ is
clearly also ‘participation in the acts of genocide.’ Further, there is a language difference
between the Convention’s ‘complicity in genocide’ and the ECCC’s ‘participation in acts of
genocide.’167 However, ‘complicity’ is defined as an “association or participation in a criminal
act.”168 Thus, ‘complicity’ and ‘participation’ have the same meaning and there is no difference
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in this regard between the two documents. However, the ECCC lacks ‘incitement to genocide’ as
part if its list of punishable acts.169 While the list of punishable acts is almost identical between
the ECCC and the Convention, lack of ‘incitement to genocide’ in the ECCC statute makes the
ECCC slightly more limited than the Convention in terms of the list of punishable acts.
B. How to avoid problems that could arise from the differences between Article
4 of the ECCC and the Convention
Problems may arise if the ECCC indicts a person under Article 4 and the indictment falls
under an area where Article 4 and the Convention differ. This could result in significant time
spent in the court trying to figure out whether the difference in language creates a different
meaning between the two documents. Therefore, the best way to avoid any problems in regard to
charging people under Article 4 is to bring separate charges under the Convention as well. By
charging the crimes under both the Convention and the ECCC, the prosecution can avoid any
questions of whether or not what is charged is a crime due to the difference of language of the
two documents. Also, charging a person under both the ECCC and the Convention would
prevent the dismissal of the charge if the ECCC finds that the ECCC statute is inapplicable due
to its retroactive nature because the indictment under the Convention would still stand.
Article II of the Convention is arguably more limiting than the corresponding section of
Article 4 of the ECCC. By limiting the charges to the examples enumerated in Article II of the
Convention, the prosecution would stay within the narrower scope of the Convention. While this
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would prevent the prosecution from using the broader discretion of the ECCC statute, it would
avoid any problem that might arise if a defendant challenges the ECCC statute.
In contract, Article 4 of the ECCC is more limiting than Article III of the Convention. All
acts listed in the ECCC statute are also listed in the Convention. Thus, by limiting the charges to
those acts enumerated in Article 4, the prosecution would not go outside the scope of the
Convention. Even if the ECCC finds that the Convention is controlling due to the ‘as defined’
language at the beginning of Article 4, charging a defendant under Article 4 should not conflict
with the language of the Convention. If the prosecution does not choose to charge people under
both the Convention and the ECCC statute, then it is advisable to refrain from charging a person
with ‘incitement to genocide,’ which is not listed in Article 4.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
With the passage of Resolution 96(I) and the Convention, the United Nations attempted

to establish the crime of genocide as part of CIL. Numerous sources, ranging from trials to
statements of the International Court of Justice, support that forbidding genocide was an
established norm of CIL prior to 1975. There are also suggestions that even absent the
Convention, the principles of the Convention are under erga omnes norms, and thus Cambodia
has an obligation to all other States to protect against and punish those who commit genocide.
Further, Cambodia acceded to the Convention and later even lodged a protest regarding
Vietnam’s signing of the Convention. Cambodia also held trials and convicted the Pol Pot – Ieng
Sary clique for genocide in 1979. This is evidence that Cambodia intended to follow the
principles set forth in the Convention.
Numerous other examples exist of States prosecuting, or intending to prosecute, instances
of genocide prior to and subsequent to 1975. The statements of these courts and the wording of
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the applicable laws to prosecute for genocide show that these States considered genocide to be a
crime under CIL. Thus, genocide would also be a crime in Cambodia under CIL.
While Cambodia shows no evidence of having enacted a law making genocide a crime
prior to 1975, the ex post facto nature of Article 4 of the ECCC statute does not preclude it from
being applicable. First, the ECCC statute is fashioned after the Convention, to which Cambodia
is party. Second, many other States, some of which are not even parties to the Convention, have
ex post facto laws for genocide. In cases where these ex post facto laws have been applied, the
tribunals and courts have upheld their legitimacy because they considered the crime of genocide
to be a part of CIL.
Since there is considerable evidence to suggest that the crime of genocide was a part of
CIL prior to 1975, the language differences between the Convention and Article 4 of the ECCC
statute may be largely irrelevant. Further, since the ECCC statute clearly states that it is
codifying the crime of genocide, as defined in the Convention, it would seem that the
Convention should control any language differences between the two. However, because
differences do exist, it would be prudent to recognize this fact and charge defendants under both
the Convention and the ECCC statute.
In summary, the weight of the evidence shows that genocide was a crime under CIL in
1975, which makes genocide a crime in Cambodia in 1975. Further, Cambodia, as party to the
Convention, is obliged to uphold the principles set forth in the Convention.
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